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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Traditionally, American courts have viewed covenants not to compete 
(―CNCs‖) with disfavor because they operate as a restraint of trade.
1
  
Nevertheless, state law varies widely with some state legislatures more 
willing to protect, and some courts far more willing to enforce CNCs than 
others.  The divergence in state law is largely attributable in part to the 
reality that CNCs do not fit comfortably into a single area of law but 
instead involve concepts from both contract law and trade secret law.  
Where a court views the proper place for CNCs on the continuum between 
 
 *  J.D., University of Pennsylvania Law School, 2011. 
 1. See, e.g., Lucente v. Int‘l Bus. Mach. Corp., 310 F.3d 243, 254 (2d Cir. 2002) 
(stating that the Second Circuit ―disfavor[s] restrictive covenants in the employment 
context,‖ enforcing them ―only to the extent they are reasonable and necessary to protect 
valid business interests‖); Roth v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 532 F. Supp. 1029, 1031 (D. 
Minn. 1982) (―Generally, Minnesota courts look with disfavor on restrictive covenants in 
employment contracts because they operate as a restraint of trade.‖); Robinson v. Boohaker, 
Schillaci & Co., 767 So. 2d 1092, 1094 (Ala. 2000) (―Alabama law strongly disfavors 
prohibitions that restrain one from exercising a lawful profession, and this Court has 
routinely refused to enforce such prohibitions.‖); Kenneth R. Swift, Void Agreements, 
Knocked-Out Terms, and Blue Pencils:  Judicial and Legislative Handling of Unreasonable 
Terms in Noncompete Agreements, 24 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L. J. 223, 225 (2006-2007) 
(stating that ―[m]ost courts . . . note that the law looks at [CNCs] with ‗disfavor‘ and 
subjects them to careful scrutiny‖).  But see Maw v. Advanced Clinical Commc‘ns, Inc., 
179 N.J. 439, 447 (N.J. 2004) (holding that do-not-compete provisions are not per se illegal, 
and that it is inaccurate to describe current case law, which allows enforcement of 
reasonable non-compete agreements, as a ―clear mandate‖ that disfavors such agreements). 
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pure contract law and trade secret law dictates, in part, the enforceability of 
such agreements.  Under pure contract law theory, courts will not scrutinize 
the adequacy of consideration or vitiate an otherwise valid contract in order 
to protect a party who made a bad deal.
2
  In contrast, courts routinely 
scrutinize the reasonableness of CNCs based on strong public policy 
considerations against restricting a person‘s livelihood.
3
  CNCs can also be 
viewed as protecting employer information or know-how that does not 
quite rise to the level of trade secrets.  Where enforced, CNCs expand the 
protections afforded to trade secrets under the Uniform Trade Secret Act 
(―UTSA‖)
4
 because the information protected includes not only trade 
secrets but also proprietary business information.
5
  Additionally, whereas 
recovery under the UTSA requires a showing of threatened or actual 
misappropriation, an employer seeking to enforce a CNC need not allege 
bad faith.
6
 
In Part II of this comment, I argue that because state courts and 
legislatures are increasingly unwilling to enforce CNCs, employers can no 
longer rely solely on such agreements to protect their legitimate business 
interests in trade secrets and other proprietary business information.
7
  In 
 
 2. HUGH COLLINS, THE LAW OF CONTRACT 60 (2003) (stating that ―[a]lthough the 
doctrine of consideration requires an exchange of something, it leaves it to the parties to 
determine what they value and the price which they are prepared to pay for any item‖). 
 3. The careful or heightened scrutiny which courts apply to contracts restricting an 
employee‘s ability to choose where he wants to work is unsurprising in light of the outright 
prohibition on contracting oneself into involuntary servitude.  See Bailey v. Alabama, 211 
U.S. 452 (1908) (holding unconstitutional an Alabama statute that criminalized the mere 
failure or refusal to serve where an employee was indebted to an employer since it was akin 
to forced servitude which was illegal under the Thirteenth Amendment).  In both cases, 
public policy favors employee mobility, individual choice and the superiority of 
inalienability rights over the traditional hands-off approach courts otherwise use to decide 
contract cases. 
 4. UNIFORM TRADE SECRETS ACT OF 1979 § 1(4), 14 U.L.A. 542 (1979). 
 5. See, e.g., Cont‘l Grp., Inc. v. Kinsley, 422 F. Supp. 838, 844 (D. Conn. 1976) 
(upholding a restrictive covenant on the basis of an employee‘s knowledge of information 
regarding a product‘s stage of production that did not qualify as a trade secret). 
 6. See, e.g., Estee Lauder Cos. v. Batra, 430 F. Supp. 2d 158, 175 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) 
(granting a preliminary injunction enjoining an employee from working for a competitor of 
his former employer in the skincare and cosmetics industry where the former employee had 
signed a CNC since, ―even assuming the best of good faith, it is doubtful whether the 
defendant could completely divorce his knowledge of the trade secrets from any . . . work he 
might engage in‖ (internal citation omitted)); Cont‟l Grp., 422 F. Supp. at 845 (D. Conn. 
1976) (applying New York Law) (holding that an eighteen-month restrictive covenant 
precluding an employee from working for a competitor in the injection molding plastics 
industry was reasonable despite no proof of actual disclosures, reasoning that ―[i]t is enough 
if the second employer‘s work is sufficiently similar to that of the first employer to make 
likely the risk of disclosure by the employee in the course of his subsequent employment‖). 
 7. While this comment focuses exclusively on the legitimate business interest 
employers have in trade secrets and proprietary business information, other legitimate 
business interests recognized by the courts and protectable by CNCs in some jurisdictions 
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light of this reality, in Part III, I examine the relative strengths and 
weaknesses of a number of alternative approaches available to employers 
both ex-ante, upon hiring an employee, and ex-post, after the employee 
leaves, to protect trade secrets and other proprietary business information 
from falling into the hands of a competitor.  In the main, the best approach 
for any given employer will depend upon the type of information it needs 
to protect, and that approach may include a combination of ex-ante and ex-
post measures. 
II.  INCREASING DISFAVOR OF CNCS 
Of late, CNCs have come under increasing attack by courts, 
legislatures, and scholars.  Recent precedent suggests courts will apply 
heightened scrutiny to CNCs, representing a shift in the law in favor of 
employee mobility.
8
  Legislatures and scholars also argue that CNCs are 
not well suited to the changing nature of the employment relationship and 
inhibit innovation in a high-tech economy.
9
 
 
include customer goodwill, customer contacts, and investments in training.  See Swift, supra 
note 1, at 233-36 (explaining the criteria courts have used to determine legitimate business 
interests from training, customer contacts, and goodwill).  Overreliance on CNCs is 
particularly problematic where an employer competes nationally or internationally since 
some states and foreign jurisdictions refuse to enforce CNCs even in light of choice of law 
clauses.  See Thomas M. Hogan, Uncertainty in the Employment Context:  Which Types of 
Restrictive Covenants are Enforceable?, 80 ST. JOHN‘S L. REV. 429, 439-40 (2006) (stating 
that some courts, most notably those in California, have refused to respect choice of law 
clauses and have struck down certain CNCs formed in other states as against the public 
policy of California); Johan Lubbe, Robert Fischer & Shawn Kee, Cross-border restrictive 
covenants, 1 LAB. & EMP. BENEFITS 39, 41 (2001-2008) (noting that ―[i]n a few 
jurisdictions, such as India, post-employment [CNCs] are illegal and unenforceable‖ and 
that in other jurisdictions such as China, CNCs are only enforceable against certain 
categories of employees, including senior management and senior technicians). 
 8. Michael J. Garrison & John T. Wendt, The Evolving Law of Employee Noncompete 
Agreements:  Recent Trends and an Alternative Policy Approach, 45 AM. BUS. L.J. 107, 
111-12 (Spring 2008) (stating that ―[t]he emerging trend in the law of employee 
noncompete agreements suggests that courts are generally more inclined to invalidate 
employee noncompete agreements than [they have been in prior decades] and that the law of 
employee noncompete agreements is becoming more protective of the employee‘s interest 
in mobility‖). 
 9. Id. at 112 (stating that ―[t]he emerging new trend in the law of employee [CNCs] 
suggests that courts are generally more inclined to invalidate employee [CNCs]‖ and that 
courts are ―becoming more protective of the employee‘s interest in mobility‖ in part because 
of the ―fundamental changes taking place in the economy and in the workplace‖); Hogan, 
supra, note 7, at 431 (arguing that ―in an era of high employee mobility, it is sometimes 
difficult to rationalize the need for [restrictive covenants]‖). 
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A.  Courts Apply Increasingly Heightened Scrutiny in Reviewing the 
Enforceability of CNCs 
In light of the public policy in favor of employee mobility, courts 
generally enforce CNCs only to the extent that they are reasonable in scope 
(geographically and temporally) and necessary to protect a legitimate 
business interest.
10
  In addition to these factors, courts have given 
increasing weight to the following two factors:  ―(1) whether the agreement 
is injurious to the public, and (2) a balancing of the harms between the 
employer‘s legitimate interest and the harshness to the employee.‖
11
 
Traditionally, courts have limited the type of legitimate interests that a 
CNC may protect
12
 and have required that such agreements be ―narrowly 
tailored to preclude only those positions . . . necessary to protect‖ such 
interests.
13
  Some commentators note that recent precedent, including 
opinions from states that traditionally have enforced CNCs, demonstrates 
the current universal reluctance of courts to enforce such agreements ―[i]n 
recognition of our currently dismal economy and the need to permit people 
to work . . . 
.‖14
  While a thorough review of recent opinions concerning the 
enforceability of CNCs is beyond the scope of this comment, two recent 
opinions demonstrate this pro-employee trend. 
1. New York:  IBM Corp. v. Johnson 
In International Business Machines Corp. v. Johnson, a 2009 opinion 
from the United States District Court for the Southern District of New 
York, the court denied IBM‘s request for a preliminary injunction to enjoin 
its former Vice President of Corporate Development from working for 
Dell, one of IBM‘s biggest competitors in the computer technology 
industry.
15
 
In New York, a party seeking a preliminary injunction must 
demonstrate two elements:  ―(1) the likelihood of irreparable injury in the 
absence of an order or injunction; and (2) either (a) likelihood of success on 
the merits or (b) sufficiently serious questions going to the merits to make 
them a fair ground for litigation plus a balance of the hardships ‗tipping 
 
 10. See Hogan, supra note 7, at 442 (summarizing the case law from various 
jurisdictions supporting the two prong test for determining whether to enforce an CNC). 
 11. Swift, supra note 1, at 231. 
 12. Id. at 233 (stating that courts, in general are willing to protect three groups of 
legitimate business interests:  (1) an investment in training, (2) trade secrets, and (3) 
customer good will). 
 13. Id. at 236 n.66 (citing precedent establishing this requirement). 
 14. Russell Beck, Beyond the noncompete, COMPUTERWORLD, June 2, 2009, available 
at http://www.computerworld.com/s/article/9133835/Beyond_the_noncompete. 
 15. Int‘l Bus. Machs. Corp. v. Johnson, 629 F. Supp. 2d 321, 323 (S.D.N.Y. 2009). 
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decidedly‘ in the movant‘s favor.‖
16
  In Johnson, the court first determined 
that IBM failed to prove a likelihood of success on the merits because 
Johnson signed his CNC on the wrong signature line, demonstrating, at 
best, an ambiguous intent to enter into the CNC.
17
 
The court next turned to the alternative theory under which the Second 
Circuit has held that a party may obtain injunctive relief in the context of 
CNCs—by the employer‘s showing (1) a sufficiently serious question 
going to the merits plus (2) hardship tipping decidedly in the employer‘s 
favor.
18
  After noting that this case satisfied the first prong, the court 
focused on a balancing of the hardships, finding that ―IBM would 
undoubtedly suffer harm absent an injunctive order‖ since Mr. Johnson 
―has inside strategic business information about IBM, and disclosure of that 
information would harm the Company.‖
19
  Nevertheless, the court found 
that ―IBM ha[d] overstated its case‖ because Johnson ―d[id] not have the 
sort of information that is considered quintessential trade secret 
information—detailed technical know-how, formulae, designs, or 
procedures.‖
20
 
In ultimately denying IBM‘s request for injunctive relief, the court 
focused on equitable factors, highlighting the current bleak state of the 
economy.  The court held that ―[t]he damage to Mr. Johnson‘s career and 
the risk that he will be sentenced to an early retirement, especially during 
these volatile economic times, cannot be underestimated‖
21
 and thus 
―forcing Mr. Johnson . . . to abstain from plying his trade for a year would 
cause him not insubstantial harm.‖
22
  Finally, the court supported its 
holding on more general grounds by invoking New York‘s public policy, 
which ―strong[ly] disfavor[s] . . . non-competition covenants in 
 
 16. Id. at 329. 
 17. Id. at 333 (reasoning that ―IBM faces a daunting, if not insurmountable, task in 
convincing a finder-of-fact that it treated Mr. Johnson‘s ambiguous conduct as an 
acceptance of its offer to enter into a [CNC]‖). 
 18. Id. 
 19. Id. at 335 (stating that 
According to IBM, Mr. Johnson is aware of IBM‘s past, present, and future 
business strategies as well as the acquisitions, transactions, and divestitures that 
IBM is considering.  Because of his work as head of IBM‘s Corporate 
Development group, Mr. Johnson knows IBM‘s strategies for growth . . . Mr. 
Johnson is aware of its assessment of its clients‘ needs, its competitors‘ 
strategies, its opportunities, and its strategies for carrying out its business 
objectives.  Mr. Johnson knows in which areas, companies, and technologies 
IBM will invest, at what times, and with what expected rates of return. 
). 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. at 337 (emphasis added). 
 22. Id. at 336. 
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employment contracts.‖
23
 
While this case is unique because the CNC between IBM and Johnson 
was of questionable validity, the District Court‘s reasoning does evince a 
shift in willingness to enforce CNCs.  Traditionally, New York had been 
willing to grant preliminary injunctions ―where the movant competes 
directly with the prospective employer and the transient employee 
possesses highly confidential or technical knowledge.‖
24
  Here, the court 
acknowledged that Johnson possessed highly confidential information, that 
Dell was a competitor of IBM, and that IBM would be harmed if the 
injunction were denied.  Nevertheless, the court decided in favor of 
Johnson, relying heavily on public policy concerns, which it considered all 
the more pressing in light of the current economic downturn.  In sum, this 
case signals a ratcheting up of the harm an employer must show before a 
New York court will enjoin an employee from working for a competitor 
even where a potentially valid CNC exists. 
2. California:  Edwards v. Anderson and Dowell v. Biosense 
Webster, Inc. 
In California, by far the most employee-friendly state, courts have 
interpreted California Business & Professions Code, § 16600
25
 as almost 
completely banning CNCs.  As applied by the courts, California law allows 
for CNCs in only three narrow circumstances:  those agreements related to 
(1) the sale or business, (2) dissolution of a partnership, or (3) termination 
of a member‘s interest in a limited liability company.
26
 
 
 23. Id. at 337. 
 24. Earthweb, Inc. v. Schlack, 71 F. Supp. 2d 299, 309 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (emphasis 
added). 
 25. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 16600 (West 2009) (―Except as provided in this chapter, 
every contract by which anyone is restrained from engaging in a lawful profession, trade, or 
business of any kind is to that extent void.‖). 
 26. See, e.g., Dowell v. Biosense Webster, Inc., 102 Cal. Rptr. 3d 1, 8 (Cal. Ct. App. 
2009) (describing the three exceptions to California Bus. & Prof. Code, § 16600 which 
otherwise bans non-compete agreements:   
One who sells the goodwill of a business, or all of one‘s ownership interest in a 
business entity (which includes partnerships or corporations), or substantially all 
of its operating assets and goodwill, to a buyer who will carry on the business 
may agree with the buyer not to carry on a similar business within a specified 
geographic area, if the business will be carried on by the buyer (Bus. & Prof. 
Code, § 16601); upon dissolution of a partnership or dissociation of a partner, 
such partner may agree not to carry on a similar business within a specified 
geographic area, if the business will be carried on by remaining partners or 
anyone deriving title to the business or its goodwill (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 
16602); and a member of a limited liability company may agree not to carry on 
a similar business within a specified geographic area, so long as other members 
or anyone deriving title to the business or its goodwill carries on a like business 
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According to California courts, ―section 16600 evinces a settled legislative 
policy in favor of open competition and employee mobility.‖
27
  Unlike in 
New York and other states where courts perform an ad hoc balancing of 
employee and employer interests, in California, the legislature has pre-
determined that the balancing of interests always tips in favor of the 
employee.
28
 
 Further, in California, an employer‘s use of an illegal CNC (one 
falling outside of the three narrow exceptions) violates California‘s unfair 
competition laws.
29
  Thus, beyond refusing to enforce a CNC, a California 
court can assess penalties against an employer for trying to enforce an 
overly broad CNC.
30
 
In two recent opinions California courts have rejected or cast serious 
doubt on two judicially created exceptions to California‘s ban on CNCs.  
As a result, it appears that all CNCs will be void as a matter of law in 
California unless they fall into one of the three statutorily based exceptions 
to § 16600. 
In 2008, the California Supreme Court in Edwards v. Arthur 
Anderson
31
 rejected the ―narrow restraint‖ exception to California‘s 
prohibition on CNCs adopted by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in 
Campbell v. Trustees of Leland Stanford Jr. Univ.
32
  In Campbell, the Ninth 
Circuit interpreted § 16600 to ban only those CNCs which completely 
restrained an employee from practicing his ―profession, trade or 
business.‖
33
  The Ninth Circuit remanded the case for the District Court to 
determine whether the CNC at issue completely barred the employee from 
practicing his trade (and thus was void) or whether it was a valid narrow 
restraint, only barring him from pursuing ―a small or limited part of [his] 
 
(Bus. & Prof. Code, § 16602.5). 
). 
 27. Id. at 10. 
 28. Id. (stating that, in California ―[t]he interests of the employee in his own mobility 
and betterment are deemed paramount to the competitive business interests of the 
employers, where neither the employee nor his new employer has committed any illegal act 
accompanying the employment change‖  (quoting Diodes, Inc. v. Franzen, 67 Cal. Rptr. 19, 
26 (Cal. Ct. App. 1968))). 
 29. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17200 (2010) (defining unfair competition as including 
―any unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act or practice and unfair, deceptive, untrue or 
misleading advertising . . . ‖). 
 30. See, e.g., Application Grp., Inc. v. Hunter Grp., Inc., 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 73, 88-91 
(Cal. Ct. App. 1998) (holding that § 17200 makes violations of other provisions of the 
California Business & Professional Code independently actionable). 
 31. Edwards v. Anderson LLP, 189 P.3d 285, 291-92 (Cal. 2008). 
 32. Campbell v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Jr. Univ., 817 F.2d 499, 502 (9th Cir. 
1987). 
 33. Id. 
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business, trade or profession.‖
34
   
In Edwards, Arthur Anderson (AA) argued that its eighteen-month 
CNC should be enforced because it did not completely restrain its 
employee, Edwards, from practicing his profession.
35
  Instead, AA asserted 
that the CNC at issue only narrowly restrained Edwards from ―performing 
professional services of the type he had provided while at AA, for any 
client on whose account he had worked during 18 months prior to his 
termination.‖
36
 
The California Supreme Court declined to follow the Ninth Circuit, 
noting that no California state court had adopted the ―narrow restraint 
exception.‖
37
  The court reasoned that the language of § 16600 is 
―unambiguous‖ and ―if the Legislature intended the statute to apply only to 
restraints that were unreasonable or overbroad, it could have included 
language to that effect.‖
38
  Notably, the Edwards court declined to 
comment on another judicially created exception to § 16600, the so-called 
―trade secret exception,‖ since Edwards did not dispute the portion of his 
employment agreement that prohibited him from disclosing trade secrets.
39
 
 Two California Courts of Appeal have recently addressed the ―trade 
secret exception‖ issue left open by Edwards, both casting serious doubt on 
its viability.  First, in The Retirement Grp. v. Galante, the Court rejected an 
argument by an employer that its non-solicitation agreement was valid 
under the ―trade secret exception,‖ reasoning: 
[Section] 16600 bars a court from specifically enforcing (by way 
of injunctive relief) a contractual clause purporting to ban a 
former employee from soliciting former customers to transfer 
their business away from the former employer to the employee's 
new business, but a court may enjoin tortious conduct (as 
violative of either the Uniform Trade Secrets Act and/or the 
unfair competition law) by banning the former employee from 
using trade secret information to identify existing customers, to 
facilitate the solicitation of such customers, or to otherwise 
unfairly compete with the former employer.
40
 
The court went on to explain that conduct which is violative of the 
 
 34. Id. (quoting Boughton v. Socony Mobil Oil Co., 41 Cal. Rptr. 714, 716 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 1964)). 
 35. Edwards, 189 P.3d at 290-91. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. at 285. 
 38. Id. at 285-86 (emphasis added). 
 39. Id. at 289 n.4 (―We do not here address the applicability of the so-called trade secret 
exception to section 16600, as Edwards does not dispute that portion of his agreement or 
contend that the provision of the noncompetition agreement prohibiting him from recruiting 
Andersen‘s employees violated section 16600.‖). 
 40. Ret. Grp. v. Galante, 98 Cal. Rptr. 3d 585, 593 (Cal. Ct. App. 2009). 
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UTSA or unfair competition laws is enjoinable ―not because it falls within 
a judicially-created exception to the [section] 16600 ban on contractual 
non-solicitation clauses, but is instead enjoinable because it is wrongful 
independent of any contractual undertaking.‖
41
 
In a similar vein, the Court of Appeals in Dowell v. Biosense Webster 
enjoined an employer from enforcing a CNC and a non-solicitation clause 
in an employee‘s employment agreement based on the unambiguous 
language of § 16600 and further held that the employer‘s use of an illegal 
employment agreement violated the § 17200 prohibition on unfair 
competition.
42
  In so holding, the court rejected the employer‘s argument 
that its CNC fell within the ―trade secret exception‖ to § 16600.
43
  The 
court stated that ―[e]ven assuming the exception exists . . . it has no 
application here . . . because the [CNC and non-solicitation agreement] are 
not narrowly tailored or carefully limited to the protection of trade secrets, 
but are so broadly worded as to restrain competition.‖
44
  Further the court 
stated in dicta that it ―doubt[ed] [the] continued viability‖ of such an 
exception.
45
 
These holdings cast serious doubt on the ability of California 
employers to enter into CNCs to protect trade secrets, regardless of how 
narrowly such agreements are tailored.  After these holdings it appears that 
California employers are seriously limited in their ability to protect trade 
secrets unless they can show actual or threatened misappropriation under 
California‘s version of UTSA.
46
  At that point, unfortunately, it may be too 
late to prevent the harm caused by disclosure to a competitor. 
B.  State Legislatures‟ Narrowing of the Permissible Scope of CNCs and 
Movement to Outlaw CNCs 
While California‘s § 16600 statue is the most hostile to CNCs, a 
number of other state legislatures are becoming decidedly more employee-
friendly in limiting enforcement of CNCs.  Some have limited the 
applicability of CNCs by profession, excluding, most notably, doctors, 
lawyers and broadcast professionals;
47
 and at least one state legislature has 
 
 41. Id. (emphasis added). 
 42. Dowell v. Biosense Webster, Inc., 102 Cal. Rptr. 3d 1, 3-5 (Cal. Ct. App. 2009). 
 43. Id. at 11. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. 
 46. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3426 (West 2009). 
 47. Delaware and Illinois preclude the use of CNCs for physicians and broadcast 
industry employees, respectively.  See Alison Lobron, Free Labor Market:  Ban on Non-
compete Contracts Promoted as a Way to Foster Innovation, COMMONWEALTH, Summer 
2009, at 34 (stating that ―[u]nder Massachusetts law, certain groups—such as doctors, 
lawyers, and broadcasters—cannot be asked to sign [CNCs]‖). 
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limited CNCs to senior management level employees.
48
 
Massachusetts has previously contemplated banning CNCs altogether 
or severely narrowing the types of permissible CNCs in light of 
California‘s perceived economic advantage in attracting successful 
technology start-ups often formed by ex-employees of other technology 
companies.
49
  While it appears unlikely that the Massachusetts legislature 
will outlaw CNCs, a recently proposed bill would limit the ability of 
employers to restrain employees beyond one year and require employers to 
provide consideration beyond continued employment to employees who 
sign a CNC after beginning employment.
50
 
C.  The New Economy and the New Employment Relationship 
In an attempt to explain the increasing disfavor of CNCs by courts and 
legislatures, scholars have focused on the changing nature of the 
employment relationships and the manner in which innovation occurs in 
today‘s high-tech economy. 
1. Employability As the Quid-Pro-Quo of the New Employee 
Relationship 
Michael Garrison and John Wendt argue that CNCs are ―ill suited‖ to 
the realities of the current American economy ―where job insecurity and 
employee mobility are key features.‖
51
  Garrison and Wendt contrast what 
they conceptualize as the old ―industrial employment relationship,‖ 
characterized by ―long-term commitments from employers and employees, 
advancement within a firm, and job security‖
52
 with the ―new employment 
relationship,‖ stating: 
The new employment relationship is more uncertain and flexible 
than the industrial model.  A new psychological contract is 
 
 48. Swift, supra note 1, at 244 (noting that in Colorado, per COLO. REV. STAT. ANN.       
§ 8-2-113(2)(d) (West 2003), CNCs are limited to only ―executive and management 
personnel and officers and employees who constitute professional staff to executive and 
management personnel‖). 
 49. See Lobron, supra note 47, at 33 (stating that ―some entrepreneurs and venture 
capitalists have latched onto non-competes, and [Massachusetts state Representative Will] 
Brownsberger‘s bill, as a way to make the Massachusetts entrepreneurial climate as open 
and mobility-friendly as they perceive California‘s to be‖). 
 50. See Russell Beck, Massachusetts Noncompete Bill Refiled, FAIR COMPETITION LAW 
BLOG (Jan. 20, 2011) http://faircompetitionlaw.com/2011/01/20/massachusetts-noncompete-
bill-refiled/ (summarizing a noncompete bill filed with the Massachusetts House of 
Representatives and sponsored by Representative Lori Ehrlich (D-Marblehead) and 
Representative William Brownsberger (D-Belmont)). 
 51. Garrison & Wendt, supra note 8, at 168. 
 52. Id. at 165. 
NICANDRI_FINALIZED_SIX.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 8/26/2011 10:55 AM 
2011] NON-COMPETE AGREEMENTS IN THE NEW ECONOMY 1013 
 
emerging that reflects the realities of the new workplace.  Under 
the new implicit quid pro quo, employers do not make a long-
term commitment of employment and job security in exchange 
for the loyalty of the employee.  Rather, if the employer makes 
any implied commitment at all, it is that employment will provide 
employees with the skills and experiences necessary to make 
them competitive in the market.  Employability, not employment, 
is what the employer implicitly offers in exchange for the 
employee‘s efforts and productivity.
53
 
Thus, in light of high employee mobility in the current economy, 
CNCs seem particularly burdensome insofar as they limit employees‘ 
ability to bring their acquired skills to a new employer. 
2. The New Model of Corporate Innovation 
Employers who oppose limitations on CNCs argue that such 
agreements foster innovation and strengthen the economy by encouraging 
companies to invest in research and design (―R&D‖) without fear that their 
competitors will poach knowledgeable employees or that such employees 
will leave to start their own directly competing business.
54
 
 However, in sharp contrast to this argument, recent research from 
the UCLA Anderson School of Management shows that enforcement of 
CNCs actually tends to be accompanied by decreased spending on R&D.
55
  
Further, other research shows that an employee who signs a CNC is less 
likely to develop new ideas for an existing employer since the employee 
knows he will not be able to profit from the idea or start a new business 
 
 53. Id. at 166-67. 
 54. See, e.g., Wade Roush, Compromise Bill Would Allow, But Scale Back, Noncompete 
Agreements in Massachusetts, XCONOMY BOSTON, (July 20, 2009), 
http://www.xconomy.com/boston/2009/07/20/compromise-bill-would-allow-but-scale-back-
noncompete-agreements-in-massachusetts/ (stating that employers in Boston who oppose 
the proposed legislation to ban restrictive covenants argue that CNCs are needed to keep 
employees from leaving with company secrets and starting directly competitive businesses); 
see also, Scott Kirsner, Dear Captains of Industry:  Where is the Data to Support Your 
Position on Noncompetes, BOSTON GLOBE, (Aug. 4, 2009, 7:20 AM) 
http://www.boston.com/business/technology/innoeco/2009/08/dear_captains_of_industry_w
her.html (stating that companies in Boston that oppose a recently introduced bill banning 
non-competes argue that ―noncompetes are  ‗essential tools to attract and retain 
employees,‘‖ and that today‘s start-ups will not be able to ―mature into successful firms if 
their top performers are easily poached‖). 
 55. Mark J. Garmaise, Ties that Truly Bind:  Non-competition Agreements, Executive 
Compensation and Firm Investment, UCLA Anderson, available at 
http://personal.anderson.ucla.edu/mark.garmaise/noncomp7.pdf (concluding that ―that 
increased enforceability [of CNCs] leads to . . . lower and more salary-based compensation, 
reduced post-transfer compensation, lower R&D spending and reduced capital expenditures 
per employee‖). 
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using that concept.
56
  In fact, a third study concludes that biotech 
companies located in jurisdictions where CNCs are strictly enforced spawn 
fewer new start-ups.
57
 
 Scholars of innovation argue that CNCs are ineffective as a legal 
tool in the new economy since they are based on an outdated conception of 
the corporation as the author and inventor.
58
  Scholars contrast the old 
―mass production‖ or ―industrial‖ system, where innovation occurred in a 
linear process from idea to product within a single company, with the new 
―synthetic‖ or ―network‖ system where an invention ―is neither originated 
nor fully developed by a single corporation.‖
59
  In the new economy, 
networks of individuals from different firms, along with government and 
academic institutions share ideas and problem solve as a group in order to 
innovate.
60
  In a forthcoming article, Mark Lemley and James Pooley argue 
that employee mobility makes possible these idea ―spillovers‖ which ―[f]ar 
from interfering with incentives, empirical evidence suggests . . . actually 
drive further innovation.‖
61
  Other empirical research shows that firms in 
high-technology industries are more likely to increase R&D expenditures in 
light of significant intra-industry spillovers.
62
 
 In sum, these findings on employee mobility and corporate 
innovation lend support to courts‘ and legislatures‘ increasing disfavor of 
CNCs.  That being said, there are still valid policy reasons and legal 
arguments in support of offering some level of protection to employers‘ 
trade secrets and propriety information. 
III.  ALTERNATIVES TO CNCS 
In light of the perceived shortcomings of CNCs as a legal tool to 
protect employer interests, legislatures and courts have developed 
alternative statutes and legal doctrines to protect employers‘ trade secret 
and proprietary business information without overly burdening employees 
or stifling innovation. 
 
 56. See Mark A. Lemley & James H.A. Pooley, California Restrictive Employment 
Covenants After Edwards (draft), SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH NETWORK, available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1295606 (supporting the idea that California‘s more restrictive 
CNC policy promotes innovation). 
 57. Toby E. Stuart & Olav Sorenson, Liquidity Events and the Geographic Distribution 
of Entrepreneurial Activity, ADMIN. SCI. Q., Jun. 2003, at 175-201. 
 58. Catherine L. Fisk, Knowledge Work:  New Metaphors for the New Economy, 80 
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 839, 846 (2005) (citing DuPont and Disney, the inventors of nylon and 
author of Mickey Mouse, respectively, as perceived corporate inventors in ―both law and 
popular conception‖). 
 59. Id. at 847. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Lemley & Pooley, supra note 56, at 6. 
 62. Id. at 6-7. 
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 The first three alternatives I discuss, namely the inevitable 
disclosure doctrine, the UTSA, and the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act 
(―CFAA‖), involve ex-post-facto legal rules that can be used by an 
employer to enjoin a former employee from taking action, or continuing to 
take action, that would injure the employer.  The last four alternatives I 
discuss, garden leave clauses, forfeiture-for-competition (―FFC‖) clauses, 
―no-poach‖ agreements, and ―no-fault poaching truces,‖ like CNCs, 
involve ex-ante approaches that a company can take to limit the likelihood 
that a key employee will disclose trade secrets or other proprietary business 
information to a competitor or open a competing start-up utilizing such 
information. 
A.  The Inevitable Disclosure Doctrine 
The doctrine of inevitable disclosure holds that where an employee 
possesses trade secrets and, according to some courts, other proprietary 
business information,
63
 he can be temporarily or even permanently 
restrained from working for a competitor in a similar capacity because 
doing so would inevitably lead to disclosure of such information regardless 
of the employee‘s good faith.
64
  As discussed below, this doctrine has come 
under attack by courts and commentators as a form of de facto CNC for 
which the employee did not bargain.  As such, it is unlikely that this 
doctrine will supply much additional security to an employer seeking to 
protect its trade secrets and other proprietary business information from 
falling into the hands of a competitor. 
1. The Modern Formulation of the Inevitable Disclosure Doctrine: 
PepsiCo v. Redmond 
Most scholars and courts cite the 1995 Seventh Circuit case of 
PepsiCo, Inc. v. Redmond
65
 as providing the modern formulation of the 
inevitable disclosure doctrine.
66
  PepsiCo arose out of a competition in the 
 
 63. While information, such as the stage of product development, is not traditionally 
thought of as a trade secret, New York courts have been willing to protect such information 
as so-called ―trade-like secrets‖ under the doctrine of inevitable disclosure.  See, e.g., 
Lumex, Inc. v. Highsmith, 919 F. Supp. 624, 628 (E.D.N.Y. 1996) (applying New York 
Law) (enjoining a former employee from working for a competitor where it was found that 
the employee would inevitably disclose trade secrets and other proprietary business 
information such as stage of product development); Cont‘l Grp., Inc. v. Kinsley, 422 F. 
Supp. 838, 845 (D. Conn. 1976) (enforcing a CNC to protect against the release of 
employer‘s information). 
 64. Garrison & Wendt, supra note 8, at 149. 
 65. PepsiCo, Inc. v. Redmond, 54 F.3d 1262, 1264 (7th Cir. 1995). 
 66. See, e.g., Garrison & Wendt, supra note 8, at 152-53. 
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1990s between PepsiCo and Quaker Oats to dominate the sports-drink 
segment of the beverage market.
67
  Quaker Oats was at the top of the 
market with its popular Gatorade brand, and PepsiCo developed All Sport 
to compete.
68
  The Seventh Circuit enjoined Redmond, a former high-level 
PepsiCo executive with intimate knowledge of PepsiCo‘s marketing plans 
and strategies for All Sport, from working for Quaker Oats for six months 
notwithstanding Redmond‟s failure to sign a CNC.
69
 
 In so holding, the Court first noted that Redmond possessed 
―extensive and intimate knowledge‖ of PepsiCo‘s strategies and market 
plans, which it considered trade secrets.
70
  The Court further observed that, 
given the similarity of Redmond‘s new position with Quaker Oats to his 
old position with PepsiCo, it would be impossible for him not to use his 
knowledge of PepsiCo‘s strategies unless he had an ―uncanny ability to 
compartmentalize information.‖
71
  Pointing to Redmond‘s lack of candor in 
securing his new position as evidence that misappropriation of PepsiCo‘s 
confidential information was inevitable, the court ultimately held that an 
injunction was proper even if his conduct was innocent.
72
 
2. The Current Assault on the Inevitable Disclosure Doctrine: 
American Airlines, Inc. v. Imhof 
The PepsiCo opinion generated a large amount of scholarly criticism 
based on the perception that the inevitable disclosure doctrine acted as an 
after-the-fact CNC for which the employee did not bargain.
73
  In the 
aftermath of PepsiCo, many state courts either rejected the doctrine 
outright or required a showing of more than ―inevitability‖—i.e. 
―inevitability plus bad faith‖ on the part of the former employee.
74
  Even 
 
 67. Id. at 153. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. 
 70. PepsiCo, 54 F.3d at 1270. 
 71. Id. at 1269. 
 72. Id. at 1271. 
 73. See, e.g., Garrison & Wendt supra note 8, at 157 (stating that ―[c]ritics argue that 
the adoption of the PepsiCo formulation has the potential to allow employers to circumvent 
employee noncompete law and thereby upset the delicate policy balance between an 
employee‘s interest in mobility and an employer‘s interest in protecting its proprietary 
information‖). 
 74. Id. at 158-59 (reviewing case law that either rejects the inevitable disclosure 
doctrine or imposes an ―inevitability plus,‖ noting that ―[s]everal jurisdictions have either 
rejected the inevitable disclosure doctrine outright or have seriously questioned its 
legitimacy from a public policy standpoint‖).  Thus far, California, Florida, Maryland, and 
Virginia have rejected the inevitable disclosure doctrine outright, and other jurisdictions, 
like Arkansas, have limited use of the doctrine to very ―rare circumstances,‖ specifically 
rejecting use of the doctrine where the new employer takes reasonable steps to ensure that 
the employee‘s duties do not require use of the prior employer‘s confidential information.  
NICANDRI_FINALIZED_SIX.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 8/26/2011 10:55 AM 
2011] NON-COMPETE AGREEMENTS IN THE NEW ECONOMY 1017 
 
those state courts that appeared to initially embrace the doctrine have 
subsequently narrowed its application.  For example, New York courts 
were initially receptive to the doctrine; however, recent precedent casts 
doubt on the continued viability of the doctrine as a substitute for a CNC. 
In American Airlines, Inc. v. Imhof, the United States District Court 
for the Southern District of New York refused to apply the inevitable 
disclosure doctrine to enjoin Charles Imhof, a former American Airlines 
sales manager, from working for Delta Airlines, one of American‘s biggest 
competitors, absent an express CNC between Imhof and American.
75
  
Before dealing with the particulars of the case, the Court expressed strong 
disfavor for using the inevitable disclosure doctrine as a substitute for an 
express CNC.  The Court stated, ―the inevitable disclosure doctrine treads 
an exceedingly narrow path through judicially disfavored territory‖ and as 
such, ―must be applied with great care.‖
76
  The Court gave three reasons for 
the judicial disfavor of the inevitable disclosure doctrine: 
For one thing, its application can have the effect of binding the 
former employee ‗to an implied-in-fact restrictive covenant‘ not 
to compete to which the former employee never explicitly 
agreed.  This ‗runs counter to New York‘s strong public policy 
against such agreements and circumvents the strict judicial 
scrutiny they have traditionally required.‘ 
 
Second, the doctrine, if applied too readily, would tend to 
suppress healthy competition borne of ‗the uninhibited flow of 
services, talent and ideas.‘ 
 
Third, inherent in the doctrine are the ‗drawback[s] . . . that 
courts are left without a frame of reference because there is no 
express non-compete agreement to test for reasonableness‘ and 
that there are few guideposts for assessment of the likelihood that 
disclosure or misuse actually will occur.
77
 
Turning to the facts of the case before it, the court held that despite the 
similarity of the Imhof‘s previous position at American and his new 
position at Delta, American was unlikely to prevail on an inevitable 
disclosure theory since it ―failed to show that [Imhof] carrie[d] in his head 
specific confidential information that would be of any material benefit to 
Delta.‖
78
  Assuming, without deciding, that American‘s inevitable 
 
M. McClure, Arkansas Court Limits Use of Inevitable Disclosure Doctrine, (Jan. 2, 2010), 
www.aremploymentlaw.com. 
 75. Am. Airlines, Inc. v. Imhof, 620 F. Supp. 2d 574, 587 (S.D.N.Y. 2009). 
 76. Id. at 582. 
 77. Id. at 581-82. 
 78. Id. at 586.  The court further stated that ―it is well to bear in mind that we are 
dealing with an individual responsible for sales of a widely used service as distinct, for 
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disclosure theory nevertheless presented a substantial question ―that is a 
fair ground for litigation,‖ the court then turned to a balancing of the 
hardships between American and Imhof.
79
 
 In ultimately denying American‘s request for a preliminary 
injunction, the court focused on the hardship to Imhof, stating the issuance 
of an injunction would prevent Imhof from working in a sales capacity for 
any airline in the New York region.
80
  The court reasoned that the harm to 
Imhof would be ―substantial‖ since it would be ―quite unlikely that Mr. 
Imhof, a 49–year old man with a family to support during troubled 
financial times, could find employment, at least at a comparable level of 
compensation.‖
81
 
Thus, the Imhof Court, in rejecting the inevitable disclosure doctrine, 
applied reasoning similar to that of other recent courts in declining to 
enforce CNCs by focusing on the particular hardship an employee faces in 
the current economy.  In sum, since the continued viability of the inevitable 
disclosure doctrine is questionable in many jurisdictions, an employer 
would be ill-advised to rely on this doctrine to protect its trade secrets, 
particularly the type of ―soft‖ confidential marketing information at issue in 
Imhof.  As the Imhof court concluded: 
If American were as deeply concerned about the risk of Mr. 
Imhof going to work for a competitor as it now professes, it had 
the means to prevent it.  It could have offered Mr. Imhof an 
employment contract containing a reasonable covenant against 
post-employment competition.  Had it done so, and had Mr. 
Imhof accepted, American would not be in the position of which 
it now complains.
82
 
Based on Imhof and other recent cases, the doctrine of inevitable 
disclosure appears to be a poor substitute for a CNC with only a very small 
minority of courts allowing employers to invoke the doctrine to enjoin a 
former employee from working for a competitor in the absence of an 
otherwise valid CNC. 
B.  The Uniform Trade Secrets Act 
The Uniform Trade Secrets Act (―UTSA‖),
83
 which has been adopted 
in some form by the vast majority of states, is another mechanism available 
to employers to protect their trade secrets from falling into the hands of a 
 
example, from a food chemist privy to the secret formula for Coca-Cola . . . .‖  Id. at 582. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. at 586. 
 81. Id. (emphasis added). 
 82. Id. at 587. 
 83. UNIFORM TRADE SECRETS ACT, 14 U.L.A. 437 (1985). 
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competitor.
84
  Under the UTSA, a court can enjoin a former employee from 
working for a competitor if ―actual or threatened misappropriation‖ can be 
shown—i.e., that the employee has either already stolen or intends to steal 
his former employer‘s trade secrets.
85
 
 While some courts appear to conflate claims of inevitable disclosure 
and claims of threatened misappropriation under UTSA, as one court has 
clarified, ―[t]he inevitable disclosure doctrine appears to be aimed at 
preventing disclosures despite the employee's best intentions, and the 
threatened disclosure doctrine appears to be aimed at preventing 
disclosures based on the employee‘s [bad] intentions.‖
86
 
As a practical matter it is much harder to prove an employee‘s bad 
faith as required under the UTSA than to prove the existence of a valid 
CNC.  In fact, employers often enter into a CNC in order to avoid having to 
prove the elements of trade secret misappropriation, including (1) that the 
information the departing employee possesses is in fact a trade secret and 
(2) that the employee has malicious intent to profit off of the employer‘s 
proprietary information. 
Because the UTSA protects only information that qualifies as a trade 
secret, employers cannot use the UTSA as a substitute for an otherwise 
valid CNC to protect other equally valuable forms of proprietary business 
information such as marketing plans or competition analysis.
87
  In contrast, 
at least some courts have been willing to protect non-trade secret 
proprietary business information in enforcing a CNC or under the doctrine 
 
 84. Graham M. Liccardi, The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act:  A Vehicle For 
Litigating Trade Secrets in Federal Court, 8 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 155, 158 
(Fall 2008) (stating that ―[e]very state in the United States has laws protecting trade secrets 
[and f]orty-seven jurisdictions including the District of Columbia have adopted the Uniform 
Trade Secrets Act (―UTSA‖), or some variation thereof, as the basis for its trade secret 
misappropriation cause of action‖). 
 85. UNIFORM TRADE SECRETS ACT, supra, note 83. 
 86. Barilla Am., Inc. v. Wright, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12773, *25-*26 (S.D. Iowa, 
July 5, 2002) (emphasis added). 
 87. In defining what constitutes a ―trade secret‖ many states turn to the RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 757 (1939), which states that ―[a] trade secret may consist of any 
formula, pattern, device or compilation of information which is used in one‘s business, and 
which gives [the owner] the opportunity to obtain an advantage over competitors who do not 
know or use it.‖  Comment (b) to § 757 of the Restatement suggests that six factors should 
be considered when determining whether an employee‘s knowledge constitutes a ―trade 
secret‖:  ―(1) the extent to which the information is known outside of [the] business; (2) the 
extent to which it is known by employees and others involved in [the] business; (3) the 
extent of measures taken by [the business] to guard the secrecy of the information; (4) the 
value of the information to [the business] and [its] competitors; (5) the amount of effort or 
money expended by [the business] in developing the information; and (6) the ease or 
difficulty with which the information could be properly acquired or duplicated by others.‖  
Id. at cmt. b. 
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of inevitable disclosure.
88
 
In sum, while the UTSA provides some protection for an employer 
that both possesses technical trade secrets and can prove that its former 
employee acted in bad faith, it does not serve as an adequate substitute for a 
reasonable CNC. 
C.  The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act 
A third ex-post alternative to CNCs is the Computer Fraud and Abuse 
Act (―CFAA‖) which, as interpreted by the courts, gives employers a civil 
cause of action against former employees who access a computer or system 
without authorization or in excess of authorized access, and cause specific 
types of damage or loss to the employer.
89
 
Specifically, the CFAA provides six civil causes of action, five of 
which are particularly relevant to an employer seeking to protect its trade 
secrets or other proprietary business information.
90
  Under the CFAA courts 
can grant compensatory or injunctive relief where an employer can show 
that its former employee, 
(1)  intentionally accesse[d] a computer without authorization or 
exceed[ed] authorized access, and thereby obtain[ed] 
information from any protected computer;
91
 
(2)  knowingly and with intent to defraud, accesse[d] a protected 
computer without authorization, or exceed[ed] authorized 
access, and by means of such conduct further[ed] the 
intended fraud and obtain[ed] anything of value, unless the 
object of the fraud and the thing obtained consists only of 
the use of the computer and the value of such use is not 
more than $5,000 in any 1-year period;
92
 
(3)  knowingly cause[d] the transmission of a program, 
information, code, or command, and as a result of such 
conduct, intentionally causes damage without authorization, 
to a protected computer;
93
 
(4)  intentionally accesse[d] a protected computer without 
authorization, and as a result of such conduct, recklessly 
 
 88. See supra discussion accompanying note 61. 
 89. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1030 (West 2008); see also Michael R. Levinson & Christopher E. 
Paetsch, The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act:  A Powerful New Way to Protect Information, 
INTELLECTUAL PROP. NEWSLETTER (Am. Bar Ass‘n, Chicago, Ill.), Spring 2002, at 24 (―Any 
information, whether or not it is secret, can be protected under the CFAA.  All that most 
sections of the statute require is that the information be stored on a computer.‖) 
 90. Id. at 161. 
 91. Id. (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(2)(c)). 
 92. Id. (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(4)). 
 93. Id. (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(5)(A)). 
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cause[d] damage;
94
 or 
(5)  intentionally access[ed] a protected computer without 
authorization, and as a result of such conduct, cause[d] 
damage and loss.
95
 
While on its face the CFAA appears to be a promising alternative to 
CNCs,
96
 recent precedent from a number of courts limits the apparent 
protections afforded by this statute in the employee competition context by 
narrowly construing two phrases in the statute:  (1) ―without authorization‖ 
and (2) ―damage‖ or ―loss.‖ 
1. Circuit Courts Are Split Regarding Meaning of ―Without 
Authorization‖ and ―In Excess of Authorization‖ 
An initial stumbling block for employers seeking to invoke the 
protections of the CFAA is certain courts‘ narrow interpretation of the 
phrases ―without authorization‖ and ―exceeds authorized access.‖  An 
employer must show that an employee‘s computer access violated at least 
one of those tests in order to recover.  While the CFAA defines ―exceeds 
authorized access‖ as ―access[ing] a computer with authorization and to use 
such access to obtain or alter information in the computer that the accessor 
is not entitled so to obtain or alter‖ this definition begs the question of 
whether and when authorization ends and when it is exceeded, leaving it 
for courts to decide.
97
 
For example, while it is clear that a terminated employee who 
accesses his or her former employer‘s confidential documents does so 
―without authorization,‖ the issue becomes cloudier when a current 
employee, with authorized access to his employer‘s computer system, uses 
the system in a manner that is disloyal to his employer (e.g., for the benefit 
of a future employer or to engage in a competing enterprise).  Indeed, 
Circuit Courts are split as to whether a disloyal employee can be held to 
have acted ―without authorization‖ or ―in excess of authorization‖ as 
required to show a violation of the CFAA.
98
 
 
 94. Id. (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(5)(B)). 
 95. Id. (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(5)(C)). 
 96. Liccardi, supra note 84, at 160.  While initially enacted in 1984 as a criminal anti-
hacking law aimed at protecting classified information stored on government computers, the 
CFAA was amended in 1994 to include a civil enforcement provision and again in 1996 to 
expand its scope to any ―computer used in interstate commerce or communication,‖ which 
arguably includes any computer hooked-up to the Internet.  Id. at 160 n.46. 
 97. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(6). 
 98. Linda K. Stevens & Jesi J. Carlson, The CFAA:  New Remedies for Employee 
Computer Abuse, SCHIFF HARDIN LLP (Mar. 2008), 
www.schiffhardin.com/binary/stevens_carlson_ibj_0308.pdf; see also Liccardi, supra note 
84, at 163 (noting the court split). 
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 In general, courts addressing the issue have taken two positions:  a 
broad approach and a narrow approach.  Under the broad approach, ―some 
courts . . . have ruled that an employee‘s authorization to access his 
employer‘s computer system ends when he acts against his employer‘s 
interest thereby rendering his conduct ‗without authorization.‘‖
99
  In 
contrast, under the narrow approach, other courts have ruled that 
―employee malfeasance of this type generally is beyond the reach of the 
[CFAA].‖
100
 
a. The Broad Interpretation:  Shurgard Storage Ctrs. v. 
Safeguard Self-Storage 
The broad interpretation, first advanced by the District Court for the 
Western District of Washington in Shurgard Storage Ctrs., v. Safeguard 
Self Storage
101
 and subsequently adopted by the Seventh Circuit,
102
 holds 
that an employee exceeds authorization whenever he takes actions disloyal 
to his employer.   
In Shurgard, the employer, a leader in the self-service storage 
industry, allowed Eric Leland, one of its employees, access to its 
confidential marketing and business development plans during his 
employment.
103
  While still employed by Shurgard, Leland received an 
employment offer from defendant Safeguard, a direct competitor of 
Shurgard.  Leland then sent emails containing Shurgard‘s trade secrets to 
Safeguard.
104
  Shurgard, in turn, brought CFAA claims against Safeguard. 
 The court denied Safeguard‘s motion to dismiss the CFAA claims 
based on Safeguard‘s argument that as an employee of Shurgard, the 
defendant did not access Shurgard‘s proprietary information ―without 
authorization.‖
105
  The court held that Leland‘s access to Shurgard‘s 
information was no longer ―authorized‖ when he began acting as an agent 
of Safeguard against the interests of his employer.   
The court based its holding on the Restatement (Second) of Agency 
§ 112 which states that ―[u]nless otherwise agreed, the authority of an agent 
terminates if, without knowledge of the principal, he acquires adverse 
 
 99. Stevens & Carlson, supra note 98. 
 100. Id. at 98; see also Liccardi, supra note 84, at 163 (explaining the broad approach). 
 101. Shurgard Storage Ctrs., Inc. v. Safeguard Self Storage, Inc., 119 F. Supp. 2d 1121 
(W.D. Wash. 2000). 
 102. Int‘l Airport Ctrs., L.L.C. v. Citrin, 440 F.3d 418, 420-21 (7th Cir. 2006) (adopting 
a broad interpretation of the term ―without access‖ and finding a former employee liable 
under the CFAA where he destroyed files on his company-owned laptop prior to returning it 
to his former employer, and the company lacked copies of the files). 
 103. Shurgard Storage Ctrs., 119 F. Supp. 2d at 1122-23. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. 
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interests or if he is otherwise guilty of a serious breach of loyalty to the 
principal.‖
106
  According to the court, the employee accessed his computer 
―without authorization‖ as soon as he acted in a manner harmful to his 
current employer and beneficial to his prospective employer.
107
 
b. Narrow Interpretation:  LVRC Holdings v. Brekka 
The narrow approach, adopted by the Ninth Circuit, rejects the 
application of agency principles to the CFAA.  Under the Ninth Circuit‘s 
holding, liability under the CFAA does not turn on whether there is a 
breach of the duty of loyalty under state law, but instead focuses on 
whether an employee has permission to access a computer.   
In LVRC Holdings, L.L.C. v. Brekka, the Ninth Circuit rejected 
LVRC‘s CFAA claims against one of its former employees, Christopher 
Brekka, who had accessed and emailed himself a number of LVRC‘s 
proprietary documents prior to terminating his employment to start a 
competing company.
108
  The court rejected the broad approach adopted by 
the Seventh Circuit, reasoning that ―[n]o language in the CFAA supports 
LVRC's argument that authorization to use a computer ceases when an 
employee resolves to use the computer contrary to the employer's 
interest.‖
109
 
According to the LVRC court, ―authorization‖ depends on actions 
taken by the employer, not the employee.  Authorization ceases only when 
the employer rescinds the employee‘s right to use the computer.
110
  The 
court concluded, ―Brekka‘s use of LVRC's computers to email documents 
to his own personal computer did not violate [the CFAA] because Brekka 
was authorized to access the LVRC computers during his employment with 
LVRC.‖
111
 
In sum, whether an employer will be able to prove that a departing 
employee violated the CFAA by accessing the employer‘s computer 
without authorization, or in excess of authorization, turns almost 
exclusively on whether the employer‘s state has adopted a broad or narrow 
approach as discussed above. 
2. Narrow Interpretation of Damages or Loss 
Another potential pitfall for employers attempting to obtain injunctive 
 
 106. Id. at 1225 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 112 (1958)). 
 107. Shurgard Storage Ctrs., 119 F. Supp. 2d at 1225. 
 108. LVRC Holdings L.L.C., v. Brekka, 581 F.3d 1127, 1128 (9th Cir. 2009). 
 109. Id. at 1133. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. at 1137. 
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relief under the CFAA is recent precedent adopting a narrow interpretation 
of what constitutes ―loss‖ or ―damage.‖  The CFAA defines ―damage‖ as 
―any impairment to the integrity or availability of data, a program, a 
system, or information.‖
112
  The CFAA further defines ―loss‖ as ―any 
reasonable cost to any victim, including the cost of responding to an 
offense, conducting a damage assessment, and restoring the data, program, 
system or information to its condition prior to the offense, and any revenue 
lost, cost incurred, or other consequential damages incurred because of 
interruption of service.‖
113
 
 Despite these definitions, some courts have been willing to entertain 
employers‘ CFAA claims for damages stemming from the loss of trade 
secrets.  More recent precedent, however, suggests that a number of federal 
judges are unwilling to consider trade secret losses as ―losses‖ for the 
purpose of the CFAA, reasoning that the ―underlying concern of the Act 
[is] damage to data‖ and that ―[t]he statute was not meant to cover the 
disloyal employee who walks off with confidential information.‖
114
 
In Mintel Int'l Grp., Ltd. v. Neergheen, the District Court for the 
Northern District of Illinois rejected an employer‘s CFAA claim against an 
allegedly disloyal employee, reasoning that: 
[T]he plain language of the [CFAA] appears to refer to situations 
in which data is lost or impaired because it was erased or 
otherwise destroyed, or in which computer networks or databases 
are disabled.  Thus, this Court, like other courts in this district, 
finds that copying, e-mailing or printing electronic files from a 
computer database is not enough to satisfy the damage 
requirement of the CFAA.  Rather, there must be destruction or 
impairment to the integrity of the underlying data.
115
 
The court dismissed the employer‘s CFAA claim, finding that the 
 
 112. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(8) (2006). 
 113. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(11) (2006).  As an alternative to proving damages in the 
amount of at least $5,000, an employer can recover if it can show one or more of the 
following aggravating factors:  ―the modification or impairment of a medical examination of 
one or more individuals, . . . ‗physical injury to any person,‘ . . . ‗a threat to public health or 
safety,‘ or . . . ‗damage affecting a government computer used for national security, defense, 
or justice.‘‖  Liccardi, supra note 84, at 162 (citing 18 U.S.C.A. § 1030(c)(4)(A)(i)(I)-(V) 
(West 2008)). 
 114. Kluber Skahan & Assocs. v. Cordogan, Clark & Assocs., No. 08-CV-1529, 2009 
WL 466812, at *8 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 25, 2009) (quoting Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co. v. Rickman, 
554 F.Supp.2d 766, 771 (N.D. Ohio 2008)); see also Garelli Wong & Assocs., Inc., 551 F. 
Supp. 2d at 708-09 (N.D. Ill. 2008); Sam‘s Wines & Liquors, Inc. v. Hartig, No. 08 C 570, 
2008 WL 4394962, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 24, 2008) (finding no damage or loss for the 
purpose of the CFAA in situations involving alleged trade secret theft from an employer‘s 
computer network). 
 115. Mintel Int‘l Grp., Ltd. v. Neergheen, No. 08-CV-3939, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
2323, at *31 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 12, 2010). 
NICANDRI_FINALIZED_SIX.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 8/26/2011 10:55 AM 
2011] NON-COMPETE AGREEMENTS IN THE NEW ECONOMY 1025 
 
former employee had not erased any of the employer‘s documents ―nor did 
he install any destructive software that would compromise the integrity of 
the data or disable [the employer‘s] computers or its networks.‖
116
 
In sum, whether the CFAA will provide an additional basis of relief 
for employers confronted with an employee ―jumping ship‖ to work for a 
competitor depends on how the employer‘s jurisdiction interprets the key 
phrases:  (1) ―without authorization‖ or ―in excess of authorization‖ and (2) 
―damage or loss.‖  Due to the unclear scope of the CFAA and certain 
courts‘ views that the Act is inapplicable to employer/employee 
competition and trade secret disputes, the CFAA is a far from perfect 
substitute for a valid CNC. 
D.  Garden Leave Agreement 
The first alternative ex-ante approach, the so-called ―garden leave‖ 
clause (―GLC‖), is quite similar to a CNC in that it prohibits a former 
employee from working for a competitor for a set duration; however, under 
a GLC, unlike a typical CNC, the employer agrees to pay the employee 
during non-compete term.  This approach, which has been used by 
employers in the United Kingdom (―U.K.‖) for many years, is ―based on 
the quaint idea that the employer pays the employee to stay at home and 
tend to his or her ‗garden.‘‖
117
 
Like CNCs, GLCs protect employers‘ interests in trade secrets and 
other proprietary business information and prevent competition from key 
employees.
118
  Further, ―[j]ust as with a [CNC], if the employee fails to 
abide by the garden leave clause, the employer may apply to the 
appropriate court for an injunction that would enforce the provision.‖
119
 
While at first blush GLCs appear to be no different than CNCs 
containing a severance package, the two provisions differ in two separate 
but related ways.  First, an employee bound by a GLC ―remains an 
employee of his former employer during the garden leave period‖ and as 
such continues to owe his former employer a duty of loyalty.
120
  Second, 
whereas employees bound by a typical CNC do not receive health 
insurance or other employment benefits during the term of the non-
 
 116. Id. at *32. 
 117. Jeffrey S. Klein & Nichols J. Pappas, „Garden Leave‟ Clauses in Lieu of Non-
Competes, 241 N.Y. L.J. 24 (2009), available at 
http://www.weil.com/files/Publication/50a64bcb-b139-426d-
a8f713cf1a430214/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/f8b82b04-0d1d-4232-b345-
1b653061cadf/Garden_Leave.pdf (examining employers‘ use of garden leave clauses as a 
substitute for CNCs). 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. 
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compete, employees subject to a GLC are entitled to such benefits.
121
 
Although courts in the U.K. routinely enforce GLCs, very few courts 
in the U.S. have addressed the issue.
122
  Nevertheless, commentators have 
argued that U.S. courts would likely enforce GLCs because U.S. courts 
have routinely enforced similarly-structured CNCs.
123
  In determining 
whether to enforce a CNC, courts look at the harm caused to the employee, 
along with other factors.  Where U.S. courts have upheld a CNC as 
reasonable they have routinely pointed to the following terms that are 
similar to those of GLCs:  (1) the employer provides health insurance 
during the term of the non-compete;
124
 and (2) where it grants the employee 
the choice of whether or not to leave the employer.
125
  Both of these factors, 
which are also present in a typical GLC, mitigate any undue burden to the 
employee. 
While GLCs present a promising alternative to CNCs, there are two 
main drawbacks.  First, GLCs are more costly to employers because they 
require payment of salary and benefits for a period during which the 
employers receive no services from the employee.
126
  Second, while U.S. 
courts have upheld CNCs with durations of a year or more based on the 
length of time an employer‘s legitimate interests in trade secrets or other 
proprietary information remain valuable,
127
 courts in the U.K. and the U.S. 
 
 121. Id.  A number of CNCs that have come before the courts have provided for the 
continuation of salary and health care benefits during the term of the CNC.  Courts look at 
such terms favorably in determining whether to enforce an otherwise valid CNC.  See, e.g., 
Lumex, Inc. v. Highsmith, 919 F. Supp. 624, 629-36 (E.D.N.Y. 1996) (enforcing a CNC 
where the employer agreed to pay the employee‘s salary and continue providing health 
benefits during the term of the CNC); Estee Lauder Cos. v. Batra, 430 F. Supp. 2d 158, 182 
(S.D.N.Y. 2006) (enforcing the same). 
 122. Klein & Pappas, supra note 117. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id.  See supra text accompanying note 121 (suggesting that courts consider contract 
terms providing for employee health care benefits in the decision of whether to enforce a 
CNC); see also Ticor Title Ins. Co. v. Cohen, 173 F.3d 63, 71 (2d Cir. 1999) (upholding a 
six-month CNC despite the failure of the employer to pay the employee during the term of 
the CNC where the employee received $600,000 annually during the course of his 
employment). 
 125. See, e.g., Bus. Intelligence Servs., Inc. v. Hudson, 580 F. Supp. 1068, 1070 
(S.D.N.Y. 1984) (holding that a former employee would not be unduly burdened by the 
enforcement of a restrictive covenant enjoining him from working for a competitor because 
he could have continued on with her former employer).  Under a garden leave clause, it is 
typically the employee‘s resignation that starts the clock on the non-compete period.  Klein 
& Pappas, supra note 117. 
 126. Klein & Pappas, supra note 117. 
 127. See Bus. Intelligence Servs., 580 F. Supp. at 1072-73 (enforcing a one-year 
nationwide restrictive covenant preventing a top executive from working for a competitor in 
the computer software programming industry because the employee‘s knowledge would be 
competitively advantageous to both BIS and its competitors for at least a year). 
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have not been asked to uphold a GLC beyond a ninety-day period.
128
  
While U.S. courts could theoretically enforce GLCs of longer durations, the 
lack of precedent makes it unclear whether GLCs would provide a 
sufficient alternative to CNCs in situations where, for example, the 
employee possesses trade secrets or proprietary information whose value 
extends beyond ninety days.
129
 
E.  Forfeiture-for-Competition Clauses and the Employee-Choice 
Doctrine 
Another promising ex-ante option is the so-called ―forfeiture-for-
competition‖ (―FFC‖) clause, which conditions the payment of stock or 
cash awards to an (executive) employee on that employee‘s honoring an 
agreement not to work for a competitor for a certain amount of time after 
terminating his or her employment.
130
  If the employee does compete, he or 
she will not only forfeit any unvested compensation, but may also have to 
return previously awarded benefits.
131
   
While such agreements appear similar to traditional CNCs, several 
key differences make FFC clauses more acceptable to legislatures and a 
majority of courts, thereby making them more readily enforceable by 
employers. 
First, FFC clauses, unlike CNCs, are contained in a separate employee 
benefits plan rather than laid out in the employment agreement.
132
 
Second, unlike a CNC, an FFC clause does not limit an employee‘s 
mobility per se.  Instead, it merely conditions payment of additional awards 
on an employee‘s not competing.  New York courts in particular have long 
preferred FFC clauses to CNCs because FFC clauses do not impose 
―unreasonable restriction [upon] the liberty of a man to earn his living 
[since] he may be relieved of the restriction by forfeiting a contract right or 
 
 128. Klein & Pappas, supra note 117. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Michael Starr & Amy L. Strauss, Non-Competition by Employee Choice, HOGAN 
LOVELLS (Jan. 2004), http://www.hoganlovells.com/files/Publication/133ad50f-cd29-48e6-
ba2b-ff4524141b2b/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/2ceacfff-9cd7-427a-be1a-
0dd6b786bd0b/Non_comp%20By%20Employee%20Choice.pdf.  An FFC clause typically 
appears in an employee‘s stock option, bonus or other deferred or incentive-based 
compensation plan.  Klein & Pappas, supra note 117. 
 131. Starr & Strauss, supra note 130. 
 132. This creates additional problems since the Employee Retirement Income Security 
Act of 1974 (―ERISA‖) controls many aspects of employee benefit plans and expressly 
forbids FFC provisions in most employee benefits plans.  See Employee Retirement Income 
Security Act (ERISA) of 1974, 29 U.S.C. § 1053(a)(3)(B) (2006).  However, many 
executive compensation agreements are not covered by ERISA.  See Jeffrey S. Klein & 
Nicholas J. Pappas, “Forfeiture-For-Competition” Agreements, THE METRO. CORPORATE 
COUNSEL, Feb. 2004, at 11. 
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by adhering to the provisions of his contract.‖
133
   
Third, and along the same lines, FFC clauses, unlike CNCs, are not 
held to a standard of reasonableness under the approach adopted by a 
majority of jurisdictions (although a minority of courts do impose a 
reasonableness test in determining whether to enforce a FFC clause).
134
  
While CNCs must be reasonable in time, geographic scope, and tied to a 
legitimate business interest,
135
 under the majority approach to FFC clauses, 
courts will enforce such a clause ―without regard to its reasonableness if 
the employee has been afforded the choice between not competing (and 
thereby preserving his benefits) or competing (and thereby risking 
forfeiture).‖
136
 
While a lack of reasonableness requirement appears to unfairly favor 
the employer, a fourth difference between CNCs and FCC clauses lessens 
the burden upon employees; the remedy for a breach of an FFC clause does 
not include injunctive relief (which is available for breach of a reasonable 
CNC) and only includes recovery for damages.  This difference weakens 
the suitability of an FFC clause as a replacement for a CNC because an 
employee who elects to forgo additional compensation under the terms of 
an FFC clause in order to compete with her employer cannot be enjoined 
from doing so. 
In sum, FFC clauses have many benefits. They encourage employee 
retention and loyalty and promote innovation and corporate growth by 
linking an executive‘s pay to long-term corporate profitability.  
Nevertheless, an FFC clause cannot operate as a perfect alternative to a 
reasonable CNC.  Although an FFC clause makes it less attractive for an 
employee to compete, it fails to provide a cause of action to enjoin her from 
doing so. 
Effective FFC clauses may, however, provide a benefit unavailable to 
an employer under a CNC, as noted above.  Specifically, if the employee 
elects not to compete in exchange for greater benefits, the employer 
 
 133. Kristt v. Whelan, 164 N.Y.S.2d 239, 243 (N.Y.S.2d 1957) (holding that an 
employee forfeited his rights as beneficiary to a pension trust created by his employer where 
the payment of such funds were conditioned on the employees agreement not to work for a 
competitor and the employee chose to work for a competitor.  The court reasoned that the 
agreement was fair since the employee had ―the choice of preserving his rights under the 
trust by refraining from competition . . . or risking forfeiture of such rights by exercising his 
right to compete . . . ‖). 
 134. Missouri, Indiana and New York are among the states following the majority 
approach and do not impose a test of reasonableness.  Nebraska, Wisconsin, Connecticut 
and Texas adopt the minority approach and subject FFC to a test of reasonableness. 
 135. See, e.g., BDO Seidman v. Hirshberg, 712 N.E.2d 1220, 1223 (N.Y. 1999) 
(utilizing a reasonableness test whose factors analyzed include whether a CNC is tied to a 
legitimate interest of the employer and whether the CNC is reasonable in time and 
geographic scope). 
 136. Lucente v. Int‘l Bus. Machs. Corp., 310 F.3d 243, 254 (2d Cir. 2002). 
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protects not only trade secrets and other ―legitimate business interests,‖ but 
also all other information and skills possessed by the departing employee, 
from falling into the hands of a competitor. 
F.  “No-Poach” Agreements 
Another ex-ante alternative to CNCs is entry by employers into so-
called ―no-poach‖ agreements whereby employers in a given industry agree 
among themselves (usually informally) not to recruit one another‘s 
employees.  Such agreements may provide an effective means of keeping 
trade secrets and other proprietary information from falling into the hands 
of a competitor.  That being said, whether such agreements are enforceable 
remains an open question and appears to vary based on the industry, the 
terms of the agreement, and the application of anti-trust laws.  
In the technology sector, the Department of Justice recently filed a 
simultaneous complaint and proposed settlement agreement in the District 
Court for the District of Columbia stemming from allegations that major 
technology firms, including Google, Yahoo, Apple, and GenTech, effected 
a no-poach agreement in violation of anti-trust laws.  The agreement 
allegedly restricted the parties from cold-calling each other‘s employees.
137
  
While admitting to the no-poach agreement, Google‘s Associate General 
Counsel, Amy Lambert, clarified that, ―[Google‘s] policy only impacted 
cold calling, and [Google] continued to recruit from [other firms who were 
part of the no-poach agreement] through LinkedIn, job fairs, employee 
referrals, or when candidates approached Google directly.‖
138
  
Nevertheless, the DOJ alleged that the ―no-poach‖ agreement ran afoul of 
anti-trust laws by significantly restricting employee mobility and 
artificially depressing salaries of highly skilled workers in the tech 
industry.
139
  Many anti-trust experts sided with the DOJ‘s position arguing 
that ―[b]y agreeing not to hire away top talent, the [high-tech] companies 
could [have been] stifling competition and trying to maintain their market 
 
 137. Press Release, Dep‘t of Justice, Justice Department Requires Six High Tech 
Companies to Stop Entering into Anticompetitive Employee Solicitation Agreements (Sept. 
24, 2010) (available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/press_releases/2010/262648.htm) 
[hereinafter ―DOJ Sept. 24, 2010 Press Release‖]. 
 138. Nancy Gohring, Google, Apple, Others Settle Over No-Poaching Deals, 
COMPUTERWORLD (Sept. 27, 2010), http://computerworld.co.nz/news.nsf/careers/google-
apple-others-settle-over-no-poaching-deals. 
 139. Thomas Catan & Brent Kendall, U.S. Tech Probe Nears End, WALL ST. J., Sept. 17, 
2010, at B2, available at 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703440604575496182527552678.html#pri
ntMode (stating that according to the DOJ, the ―no-poach‖ agreements ―amount to an effort 
by companies to limit competition for talent, harming employees‘ ability to get the best jobs 
and wages [and reducing the incentives for people to enter professions in high demand], 
according to people familiar with the matter‖). 
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power unfairly . . . .‖
140
 
The proposed agreement, if accepted by the court, would remain in 
force for five years and prevent the named tech companies from ―entering, 
maintaining or enforcing any agreement that in any way prevents any 
person from soliciting, cold calling, recruiting, or otherwise competing for 
employees.‖
141
  In a press release issued on the same day that the complaint 
and proposed settlement were filed, the DOJ indicated that it was 
investigating other tech companies for entering into similar ―no-poach‖ 
agreements.
142
  While the settlement agreement and continued scrutiny by 
the DOJ seriously undermine the potential of ―no-poach‖ agreements to 
serve as a substitute for CNCs in the tech industry, such agreements may 
remain viable in other industries, provided that they do not suppress 
employee salaries. 
G.  No-Fault Poaching Truces or “Fair-Poaching” Agreements 
A final ex-ante approach, so-called ―no-fault poaching truces‖ or 
―fair-poaching‖ agreements, involves intra-industry agreements not to 
restrict employee mobility provided that the defecting employee limits the 
information he takes with him to his new employer.  A number of 
brokerage firms have signed a no-fault poaching truce in an effort to reduce 
legal fees associated with litigating restrictive covenants.
143
  Under this 
agreement, called ―The Protocol for Broker Recruiting‖ or ―The Protocol,‖ 
the 500 plus brokerage firms signatories agree to permit brokers to move 
freely between firms, but limit the information that a departing broker may 
take with him to his new firm in order to protect each firm‘s proprietary 
information.
144
  Unlike the ―no-poach‖ approach allegedly taken by tech-
 
 140. Cecilia Kang, Antitrust Probe Targets Tech Giants, Sources Say, WASH. POST, June 
3, 2009, at A3, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2009/06/02/AR2009060203412.html; see also Miguel Helft, U.S. 
Inquiry Into Hiring at High-Tech Companies, N.Y. TIMES, June 3, 2009, at B2, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/03/technology/companies/03trust.html (detailing the 
Department of Justice‘s investigation into possible anti-trust violations caused by the 
recruiting practices of a number of the largest technology corporations, based on 
information from ―people with knowledge of the investigation‖). 
 141. DOJ Sept. 24, 2010 Press Release, supra note 137, at 2. 
 142. Id. at 3 (―Today‘s complaint arose out of a larger investigation by the Antitrust 
Division into employment practices by high tech firms.  The division continues to 
investigate other similar no solicitation agreements‖). 
 143. See Suzanne Barlyn, ―How to Switch Firms . . . and Not Get Sued,‖ WALL ST. J., 
Sept. 20, 2010, at R9, available at 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703846604575447924199878014.html#pri
ntMode (describing the Protocol as ―a set of guidelines intended to end legal wrangling 
between firms while safeguarding clients‘ privacy and freedom to move their accounts when 
their brokers switch between firms that observe the procedures‖). 
 144. Id. (noting that ―Protocol signatories generally agree not to sue one another when 
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firms, the ―no-fault‖ poaching truce approach has the effect of enhancing 
employee mobility while protecting the true interests of the brokerage 
firms.  
While the Protocol is, in theory, a good solution that balances the 
interests of brokerage firms and employees, firms do not always honor the 
Protocol in practice, particularly where the employee‘s new employer is not 
a signatory.
145
  When financial firms bring legal action to enjoin a former 
employee from working for a competing firm, one of the main benefits of 
the Protocol, the savings in legal fees, is lost.
146
  With that said, Protocol 
signatories that bring suit are rarely successful where the employee has 
acted in accordance with the Protocol.  In addressing the issue, courts have 
typically denied Protocol signatories‘ requests for injunctive relief, 
regardless of whether the new employer was a signatory.  These courts 
reasoned that by signing the Protocol, financial firms are tacitly agreeing 
that no harm results when financial advisors switch firms.
147
 
A ―no-fault poaching‖ agreement may be a good alternative to a CNC 
in certain sectors, like the brokerage industry where client lists are at issue.  
 
their advisers switch firms, provided the advisers follow certain rules‖).  Specifically, the 
Protocol provides that:   
If departing [brokers] and the new firm follow this protocol, neither the 
departing [advisor] nor the firm that he or she joins would have any monetary or 
other liability to the firm that the [advisor] left by reason of the [advisor] taking 
the information identified below or the solicitation of the clients serviced by the 
[advisor] at his or her prior firm, provided, however, that this protocol does not 
bar or otherwise affect the ability of the prior firm to bring an action against the 
new firm for ―raiding.‖  The signatories to this protocol agree to implement and 
adhere to it in good faith. 
 PROTOCOL FOR BROKER RECRUITING 1 (2004) (emphasis in original). 
 145. Dan Jamieson, Brokers Feel Mobility Is Still Threatened, INVESTMENT NEWS (June 
16, 2008), http://www.investmentnews.com/article/20080616/REG/832686944 (stating that 
the Broker Protocol ―isn‘t always being honored, according to some attorneys familiar with 
the situation‖). 
 146. Barlyn, supra note 143, at R9. 
 147. See, e.g., Smith Barney Div. of Citigroup Global Mkts., Inc. v. Griffin, No. 08-
0022-BLS1, 2008 WL 325269, at *8 (Mass. Super. Jan. 23, 2008) (declining to grant an 
injunction where a broker left one firm that was a signatory of the Brokerage Protocol for a 
firm that was not a signatory, reasoning that where a firm: 
[P]ermits its financial advisors to leave for 38 other financial institutions [who 
are signatories to the Protocol] and solicit their former clients with Client 
Information they took from [the firm], it cannot credibly contend that the harm 
that will result if [defendants are] allowed to do the same at a 39th firm is so 
substantial and so irreparable . . . 
as to require an injunction).  The court further explained that ―‗[b]y setting up such a 
procedure for departing brokers to take client lists, [the financial services firm] tacitly 
accepts that such an occurrence does not cause irreparable harm.‘‖  Id. at *7 (quoting 
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Brennan, No. 1:07CV475, 2007 WL 632904, 
at *2 (N.D. Ohio Feb. 23, 2007)). 
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However, in industries where the employer is more concerned with other 
forms of proprietary business information and trade secrets, it is unclear 
whether such an approach would work well. 
Thus, the usefulness of ―no-poach‖ and ―no-fault poaching‖ 
agreements as alternatives to CNCs may vary greatly by industry.  ―No-
fault poaching‖ agreements appear to best balance the competing interests 
of employers and employees and work well when the member firms abide 
by them; however, because courts appear to enforce such agreements 
against member firms regardless of whether the poaching employer is a 
member or not,
148
 firms may be discouraged from signing on. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, it appears that the best way for an employer to protect 
both trade secret information and other proprietary business information is 
to take a combination of ex-ante and ex-post approaches.  From an ex-ante 
perspective, and despite courts‘ increasing disfavor, CNCs appear to 
remain a viable option for employers (in any state other than California) 
seeking to protect their legitimate interests in trade secrets, client lists, 
client goodwill, and other proprietary business information.  With that said, 
CNCs will only be enforced where the employer limits such agreements to 
key employees who possess the above information, and narrowly tailors the 
terms to meet the precedent in the employer‘s jurisdiction regarding 
reasonableness in scope, geography, and types of employment. 
Outside of CNCs, there does not appear to be a single alternative ex-
ante legal tool that would afford the same scope of protection to employers 
for about the same cost.  While GLCs appear to present the most promising 
ex-ante alternative, such clauses cost more than the traditional CNC and 
may provide insufficient protection in light of the shorter duration of GLCs 
which courts have upheld in the past.  Further, if an employee violates a 
GLC, an employer will still have to expend considerable funds in filing for 
an injunction and still must satisfy the overarching reasonableness 
requirement. 
Another promising ex-ante alternative in a majority of jurisdictions 
appears to be supplementing or replacing CNCs with FFC clauses.  
Because FFC agreements do not implicate public policy concerns regarding 
a person‘s ability to earn a living, but instead condition stock awards or 
other deferred compensation on an employee‘s not working for a 
 
 148. See Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Brennan, No. 1:07CV475, 2007 
WL 632904, at *2 (N.D. Ohio Feb. 23, 2007) (holding that mere agreement to the Protocol 
constitutes tacit acceptance that transfers of client contact information do not cause 
irreparable harm, regardless of whether the former employee leaves to work for a signatory 
or a non-signatory to the Protocol). 
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competitor for a set period of time, a majority of courts view such 
agreements more favorably.  Such clauses protect an employer‘s trade 
secrets and proprietary business information and, in a majority of 
jurisdictions, such clauses are not subject to the overarching reasonableness 
requirements that make the validity of CNCs and GLCs uncertain and 
costly to litigate.  On the other hand, FFCs are not a perfect alternative 
since an employer‘s recovery for an employee‘s violation of an FCC is 
limited to monetary relief and courts seem unwilling to enjoin such 
employees from engaging in a competitive enterprise. 
To rank ex-post alternatives becomes much more difficult because 
states vary widely in their willingness to allow an employer to assert a 
cause of action under statutory and judge-made alternatives to allegedly 
unfair competition by former employees.  Determining the best ex-post 
option for employers highly depends on:  (1) the type of information the 
employer seeks to protect; (2) the jurisdiction in which the employer 
resides; and (3) whether the employer can demonstrate bad faith on the part 
of its ex-employee.   
If the employer has established procedures to protect specified trade 
secrets and can show that the employee engaged in conduct exhibiting a 
bad faith intent to misappropriate those trade secrets, many jurisdictions 
will permit claims for injunctive relief under the UTSA. 
Alternatively, if the employer is more concerned with an employee 
misappropriating proprietary business information, or if the information 
cannot reasonably be classified as a trade secret, the CFAA may provide 
injunctive relief in jurisdictions that have adopted a broader view of that 
Act.  Provided that the employer can show that the employee accessed files 
on his employer‘s network computer in a manner that was disloyal to the 
employer, many courts will assume that the employee acted ―without 
authorization.‖  If the employer can then satisfy the ―damages or loss‖ 
requirement(s), those courts will allow recovery, including injunctive relief.  
Unfortunately, as discussed above, courts widely diverge in their 
willingness to apply the CFAA in the context of employee disloyalty and 
unfair competition because the CFAA was enacted to protect damage to 
computer systems and data stored on those systems, not to act as an 
additional means of protecting an employer‘s proprietary information. 
 
